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BY MARC I. STEINBERG"
ABSTRACT
This article analyzes the ramifications of the Delaware Supreme
Court's decision in Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp. that limited a
minority shareholder's remedy in the short-form merger context normally
to that of appraisal. This decision stands in marked contrast to the
invocation of the entire fairness test that applies in parent-subsidiary long-
form mergers. Nonetheless, important issues remain outstanding after
Glassman, including the continued critical role of adequate disclosure, the
determination offair value, the viability of the "loss state remedy" theory,
a parent corporation's increased use of the tender offer as a means to
consummate a short-form merger, andthe availability of appropriate relief,
including rescissory damages, when fraud is perpetrated in the short-form
merger setting. While applauding the Delaware Supreme Court's decision
in facilitating the effectuation of short-form mergers, and hence in
providing increased assurance of commercial certainty, Professor
Steinberg posits that the Delaware courts'keen scrutiny with respect to the
adequacy of disclosure in this context is crucial in order to provide
minority shareholders some meaningful degree ofprotection.
In Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp.,' the Delaware Supreme
Court held that, "absent fraud or illegality, appraisal is the exclusive
remedy available to a minority stockholder who objects to a short-form
merger."2 Accordingly, once a parent corporation owns at least ninety
percent of the outstanding shares of another corporation, a cash-out merger
may be effected, thereby eliminating the subsidiary corporation's minority
shareholders.' The fair dealing component of the entire fairness test
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'777 A.2d 242 (Del. 2001).
21d. at 248 (interpreting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (2001)).3In relevant part, the Delaware short-form statute, section 253, provides:
(a) In any case in which at least 90% of the outstanding shares of each class of
the stock of a corporation . . . is owned by another corporation .... the
corporation having such stock ownership may ... merge the other corporation
... into itself... by executing, acknowledging and filing, in accordance with
§ 103 of this title, a certificate of such ownership and merger setting forth a copy
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enunciated in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc." has no application in the short-
form merger context.' Shares held by minority shareholders receive fair
value pursuant to the statutory appraisal process.6
I. EXCLUSIVITY OF APPRAISAL REMEDY
In overruling its 1979 decision in Roland International Corp. v.
of the resolution of its board of directors to so merge and the date of the
adoption; provided, however, that in case the parent corporation shall not own
all the outstanding stock of... the subsidiary corporation... the resolution...
shall state the terms and conditions of the merger, including the securities, cash,
property, or rights to be issued, paid, delivered or granted by the surviving
corporation upon surrender of each share of the subsidiary corporation ....
(d) In the event that all of the stock of a subsidiary Delaware corporation... is
not owned by the parent corporation immediately prior to the merger, the
stockholders of the subsidiary Delaware corporation party to the merger shall
have appraisal rights as set forth in § 262 of this title.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 253 (2001).
4457A.2d 701,711 (Del. 1983) (explaining that fair dealing "embraces questions ofwhen
the transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed to the directors,
and how the approvals of the directors and the stockholders were obtained"). Accord McMullin
v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 917 (Del. 2000); Kahn v. Tremont Corp., 694 A.2d 422, 430-31 (Del.
1997); Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 937 (Del. 1985). See generally MARC I.
STENBERG, SECURITiESREGULATION:LIABuTr EsANDREmWEES § 15.04 (2001) (discussing fair
dealing under Weinberger and its progeny).
'Glassman, 777 A.2d at 248. The Delaware Supreme Court explained:
[W]e must decide whether a minority stockholder may challenge a short-form
merger by seeking equitable relief through an entire fairness claim. Under
settled principles, a parent corporation and its directors undertaking a short-form
merger are self-dealing fiduciaries who should be required to establish entire
fairness, including fair dealing and fair price. The problem is that § 253
authorizes a summary procedure that is inconsistent with any reasonable notion
of fair dealing. In a short-form merger, there is no agreement of merger
negotiated by two companies; there is only a unilateral act--a decision by the
parent company that its 90% owned subsidiary shall no longer exist as a separate
entity. The minority stockholders receive no advance notice of the merger; their
directors do not consider or approve it; and there is no vote. Those who object
are given the right to obtain fair value for their shares through appraisal.
The equitable claim plainly conflicts with the statute. If a corporate fiduciary
follows the truncated process authorized by § 253, it will not be able to establish
the fair dealing prong of entire fairness. If, instead, the corporate fiduciary sets
up negotiating committees, hires independent financial and legal experts, etc.,
then it will have lost the very benefit provided by the statute-a simple, fast and
inexpensive process for accomplishing a merger. We resolve this conflict by
giving effect the intent of the General Assembly. In order to serve its purpose,
§ 253 must be construed to obviate the requirement to establish entire fairness.
Id. at 247-48 (citations omitted).
6See id. at 247-48.
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Najar, holding that appraisal is not a minority shareholder's sole remedy
in a short-form merger, the Delaware Supreme Court's rationale in
Glassman is a retreat in shareholder protection under Delaware law No
longer does the majority shareholder bear the burden of entire fairness in
a short-form merger.' In the short-form merger context, use of the
meaningful minority shareholder protective mechanism of an independent
negotiating committee has become a relic of the past.'0 In this setting,
"absent fraud or illegality,"" appraisal is deemed a sufficient remedy for
providing fair value to minority shareholders. 2 However, because many
shareholders fail to perfect their right to appraisal, 3 they will be relegated
to the consideration offered by the majority shareholder. 4
On the other hand, the Glassman decision facilitates the effectuation
of related-party mergers with an increased assurance of commercial
certainty.'" Thus, the prospect of lawsuits alleging breach of fiduciary duty
'407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979). Roland adopted the Singer principles in the short-form
merger context. Id. at 1033 (relying on Singer v. Magnovox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977)).
Although Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 715, overruled Singer's business purpose test, both Roland and
Singer remained good law for the proposition that minority shareholders in either a short-form or
long-form merger were not relegated to appraisal if certain breaches of fiduciary duty were shown.
'See Glassman, 777 A.2d at 247-48.
91d.
'See Kahnv. Lynch Communication Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d I 110, 117 (Del. 1994) ("mhe
special committee must have real bargaining power that it can exercise with the majority
shareholder on an arms length basis."); Rabkin v. Olin Corp., 586 A.2d 1202 (Del. 1990) (special
committees can protect minority interests); Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929 (Del. 1985)
(recognizing the importance of independent bargaining in protecting shareholder interests);
Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 709-10 n.7 (stating that "the result here could have been entirely
different if [the subsidiary] UOP had appointed an independent negotiating committee of its
outside directors to deal with [the parent] Signal at arm's length").
"In this context, the term "fraud" appears to signify actual rather than constructive fraud.
By contrast, among Weinberger's exceptions to appraisal are "gross and palpable overreaching,
self-dealing, and deliberate waste of corporate assets." See Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714. Unless
these breaches of fiduciary duty rise to the level of actual fraud or illegality, appraisal seems to
be the exclusive remedy in short-form mergers. See Glassman, 777 A.2d at 247-48.
2Glassman, 777 A.2d at 247-48.
3See Enstar Corp. v. Senouf, 535 A.2d 1351, 1354 (Del. 1987) (requiring that demand
for appraisal under Delaware law must be made by the stockholder of record, and asserting that
"[t]he legal and practical effects of having one's stock registered in street name cannot be visited
upon the issuer"). See also MELVIN A. EISENBERO, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A
LEGAL ANALYSIS 83 (1976); F. HODoEONEAL, "SQUEEZE OUTS" OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS:
EXCLUSION OR OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATES 610 (1975); STEINBERG, supra note 4,
§ 15.06; Bayless Manning, The Shareholder's Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker,
72 YALE L.J. 223, 233 (1962).
"'See Glassman, 777 A.2d at 247-48.
131d. at 248 (holding that there is no requirement to establish entire fairness in short-form
mergers).
2002]
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in the short-form merger context becomes greatly diminished. If adequate
disclosure is provided to minority shareholders to enable them to ascertain
whether to perfect their right to appraisal, 6 short-form mergers will rarely
be subject to successful minority shareholder challenge in breach of
fiduciary duty actions."7
I1. INCREASED USE OF TENDER OFFERS
The Glassman decision also provides significant comfort to a less
than ninety percent controlling shareholder who contemplates cashing-out
the minority shareholders. Under a scenario that will become far more
common, the controlling shareholder will make an all-share, all-cash tender
offer for the shares that the shareholder does not currently own. Open
market purchases, although at times practicable, frequently will not be
feasible due to the available float and potential impact on the stock's market
price. Thus, through means of a tender offer (which will involve the
Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) going-private and/or tender
offer rules"), the majority shareholder will seek to attain at least ninety
percent ownership of the subsidiary. Once it reaches the ninety percent
level, the controlling shareholder can effect a short-form cash-out merger,
thereby eliminating the minority shareholders."
The foregoing acquisition technique may comply with Delaware law.
A majority shareholder may make a tender offer for the minority's shares
"Id ("Although fiduciaries are not required to establish entire fairness in a short-form
merger, the duty of full disclosure remains....") (citing Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5 (Del.
1998)).
"Such breaches of fiduciary duty must rise to the level of fraud or illegality in order for
minority stockholders in a short-form merger not to be relegated solely to their appraisal remedy.
See id. at 24748.
"See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13e-3, 13e-4 (2002). Generally, the SEC's going private rules
proscribe deceptive, fraudulent or manipulative acts or practices in connection with such
transactions and set forth filing, disclosure, and dissemination mandates. More extensive rules
apply if the subject issuer is publicly-held. Going Private Transactions, Securities Exchange
Release No. 16075, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 82,166 (Aug. 2, 1979)
See Howing Co. v. Nationwide Corp., 972 F.2d 700 (6th Cir. 1992) (allowing minority
shareholder action under Rule 13e-3 in freeze-out merger); ARTHUR BORDEN, GOINo PRIVATE
(1982 & Supp.); Neliva Kofele-Kale, The SEC's Going Private Rules: Analysis and
Developments, 19 SEc. REG. L.J. 139 (1991) (providing detailed analysis of Rule 13(e)'s effect
on going-private transactions in light of the Hawing decision).
19See Jesse A. Finkelstein, Recent Delaware Court Decisions Show Path to Avoid Entire
Fairness Review inSubsidiaryfBuy-Out Transactions, 33 See. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1151, 1152
(2001).
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under Delaware law without being subject to a "fair price" standard,2"
provided that the transaction is deemed noncoercive and that adequate
disclosure is provided to minority shareholders. Hence, in a noncoercive
transaction, the fiduciary tender offeror satisfies its obligations in this
context by making adequate disclosure to the minority shareholders which
enables such shareholders to make an informed investment decision on
whether to tender their shares.2 Nonetheless, Delaware authority exists
supporting the proposition that in certain circumstances, even if adequate
disclosure is provided, a tender offer made by a controlling shareholder
may be deemed coercive,22 thereby constituting a breach of fiduciary duty.23
20See Glassman, 777 A.2d at 248 ("Where the only choice for the minority stockholders
is whether to accept the merger consideration or seek appraisal, they must be given all the factual
information that is material to the decision.").
2 Finkelstein, supra note 19, at 1152. But see Joseph v. Shell Oil Co., 482 A.2d 335, 341
(Del. Ch. 1984), affd, 498 A.2d 1117 (Del. 1985) (refusing to limit remedy to appraisal where
the shareholder's disclosures are inadequate); In re Siliconix Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 18,700,
2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS 83 (Del. Ch. June 19, 2001) (requiring a showing of inadequate disclosure
or coercion in order to obtain a preliminary injunction); Cottle v. Standard Brands Paint Co., Nos.
9341, 9405, & 9151, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 40, at * 16 (Del. Ch. Mar. 22, 1990), reprinted in 16
DEL. J. CORP. L. 702, 715 (1991) (limiting required disclosures to material existing facts).
'See Eisenberg v. Chicago Milwaukee Corp., 537 A.2d 1051, 1062 (Del. Ch. 1987)
(holding, inter alia, that issuer self-tender offer was coercive); Kahn v. United Sugar Corp., No.
7313, 1985 Del. Ch. LEXIS 522, at * 17 (Del. Ch. Dec. 10, 1985), reprinted in 11 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 908, 917 (1986) (finding method of determining tender price to be coercive). In Cottle, the
Delaware Court of Chancery opined on this issue:
A claim for coercion must state that plaintiffs, the tendering stockholders, "were
wrongfully induced by some act of the defendants to sell their shares for reasons
unrelated to the economic merits of the sale." Thus, a two-tier tender offer in
which the buyer plans to freeze out non-tendering stockholders, giving them
subordinated securities in the back end, is coercive. Similarly, a "tender offer
structured so as to afford shareholders no practical choice but to tender for an
unfair price" or one at "a fair price, but structured and timed so as to effectively
deprive stockholders of the ability to choose a competing offer-also at a fair
price--that the shareholders might have found preferable" is coercive.
Actionable coercion does not exist, however, simply because a tender offer price
is too good to pass up. Further, a self-tender offer at a premium above the
shares' market price does not appear to be actionably coercive, even if paying
that premium may adversely affect the market value of the remaining
outstanding shares, provided that the offering materials make full disclosure of
such an adverse effect.
Cottle, 1990 Del. Ch. LEXIS 40, at *9-* 10 (citations omitted). For a more narrow view, see In
re Siliconix Inc. S'holders Litig., 2001 Del. Ch. LEXIS 83, at *58-*65. See generally Dennis J.
Block & Jonathan M. Hoff, The Doctrine of Inequitable Coercion Under Delaware Law,
N.Y.L.J., Apr. 22, 1999, at 5 (discussing claims of fiduciary breach based on the theory of
inequitable coercion).
'See Eisenberg, 537 A.2d at 1062; Kahn, 1985 Del. Ch. LEXIS 522, at '18, reprinted
in 11 DEL. J. CORP. L. at 918. In the tender offer followed by cash-out merger scenario
orchestrated by a majority shareholder, the price paid in the tender offer should be a relevant
factor in determining fair value in the appraisal proceeding. Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713-14.
2002]
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1H. IMPORTANCE OF ADEQUATE DISCLOSURE
Disclosure in this context is vitally important. Adequate disclosure
enables minority shareholders to make informed decisions about whether
to accept the consideration offered or to seek appraisal.24 The duty of
candor, even where shareholder action is not sought, has been established
in Delaware," imposing upon the subject fiduciary the obligation to
disclose all material facts germane to the minority shareholder's
determination of whether to undertake the appraisal route.26 The integrity
of the shareholder decision-making process itself is at stake rather than the
saddling of monetary liability or sanctions on an allegedly culpable party;27
therefore, the objective sufficiency of the information disclosed should be
the applicable standard.28 In other words, upon proof that minority
shareholders were presented with a materially deficient disclosure by the
controlling shareholder, those shareholders who had not perfected their
See generally Theodore N. Mirvis, Two-Tier Pricing: Some Appraisal and "Entire Fairness"
Valuation Issues, 38 Bus. LAW. 485 (1993) (illustrating the variety of factors used to determine
fair value).
24See Glassman, 777 A.2d at 248.
2 Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 14 (Del. 1998). See McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910,
917 (Del. 2000); Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278,279 (Del. 1978). See generally
Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Calling Off the Lynch Mob: A Corporate Director's Fiduciary
Disclosure Duty, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1087 (1996) (identifying and discussing the development and
application of fiduciary disclosure duty); Mark Klock, Litigating Securities Fraud as a Breach
of Fiduciary Duty in Delaware, 28 SEC. REG. L.J. 296 (2000) (analyzing Malone).
26See Glassman, 777 A.2d at 248. See also Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84-87 (Del.
1992) (arguing that Delaware's duty of candor offsets the relevant protections to shareholders
under federal laws).
27See Malone, 722 A.2d at 9 (holding that "directors who knowingly disseminate false
information that results in corporate injury or damage to an individual stockholder violate their
fiduciary duty, and may be held accountable in a manner appropriate to the circumstances").
2 lnterpreting Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 383 A.2d 278 (Del. 1978), and Stroud v.
Grace, 606 A.2d 75 (Del. 1992), the Delaware Supreme Court in Malone opined:
An action for a breach of fiduciary duty arising out of disclosure violations in
connection with a request for stockholder action does not include the elements
of reliance, causation and actual quantifable [sic] monetary damages. Instead,
such actions require the challenged disclosure to have a connection to the request
for shareholder action. The essential inquiry in such an action is whether the
alleged omission or misrepresentation is material. Materiality is determined
with respect to the shareholder action being soughL
Malone, 722 A.2d at 12 (emphasis added). Cf. Ash v. LFE Corp., 525 F.2d 215, 220 (3d Cir.
1975) (stating that "the objective sufficiency of the disclosure" is the standard in actions seeking
injunctive relief under the federal proxy provision, Section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act).
Note that the Delaware Supreme Court in Glassman viewed the short-form merger at issue as
involving shareholder action. See Glassman, 777 A.2d at 248 ("Although fiduciaries are not
required to establish entire fairness in a short-form merger, the duty of full disclosure remains, in
the context of this request for stockholder action.").
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right to appraisal should have the election to opt for the monetary
equivalent of that remedy (in lieu of being relegated to the consideration
paid in the short-form merger). Of course, if materially false information
was knowingly disseminated by the controlling shareholder to the minority
(thereby constituting fraud or illegality), a breach of fiduciary duty would
exist,29 giving rise to appropriate relief, including the availability of
rescissory damages."
IV. DETERMINATION OF FAIR VALUE
The determination of "fair value" in an appraisal proceeding
compensates the minority shareholder for the "taking."3 Reaffirming
Weinberger with respect to the scope of appraisal," the Delaware Supreme
Court in Glassman opined that "[t]he determination of fair value must be
based on all relevant factors, including damages and elements of future
value, where appropriate."33 Importantly, if a controlling shareholder times
2See Malone, 722 A.2d at 14.
30Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714. "Generally, a rescissory damages award allows the
plaintiff to recover the value of the stock at the time of resale or at the time ofjudgment and does
not limit the plaintiff to the stock's value at the time of the merger." Marc I. Steinberg & Evalyn
N. Lindahl, The New Law of Squeeze-Out Mergers, 62 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 379 (1984).
3 Glassman, 777 A.2d at 246.
"See id. at 248:
"[W]e... reaffirm Weinberger's statements about the scope of appraisal. The
determination of fair value must be based on all relevant factors, including
damages and elements of future value, where appropriate. So, for example, if
the merger was timed to take advantage of a depressed market, or a low point in
the company's cyclical earnings, or to precede an anticipated positive
development, the appraised value may be adjusted to account for those factors.
We recognize that these are the types of issues frequently raised in entire
fairness claims, and we have held that claims for unfair dealing cannot be
litigated in an appraisal. But our prior holdings simply explained that equitable
claims may not be engrafted onto a statutory appraisal proceeding; stockholders
may not receive rescissionary relief in an appraisal. Those decisions should not
be read to restrict the elements of value that properly may be considered in an
appraisal.
Id
331d. See STEINBERO, supra note 4, § 15.05 (discussing the impact of elements of future
value, availability of equitable relief, two-tier offers, and the stock exchange exception on fair
value); Rutherford B. Campbell, Fair Value and Fair Price in Corporate Acquisitions, 78 N.C.
L. REV. 101 (1999) (recognizing the inherent tension between moral and economic incentives in
determining fair value); Barry M. Wertheimer, The Shareholders'Appraisal Remedy and How
Courts Determine Fair Value, 47 DUKE L.J. 613 (1998) (pointing out the need for statutory and
judicial change in light of the Weinberger decision). Reflecting on Weinberger, the Delaware
Supreme Court in Glassman explained:
On the subject of appraisal, the [Weinberger] Court made several important
statements: (i) courts may consider "proof of value by any techniques or
2002]
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a short-form merger to take advantage of a depressed price for the
corporation's stock or a low point in its cyclical earnings or to precede the
public announcement of anticipated positive "news," the appraisal valuation
may be adjusted to reflect such factors. Nonetheless, unfair dealing and
other equitable claims play no role in an appraisal proceeding; hence,
stockholders may not be awarded rescissionary relief in an appraisal.34
V. FEDERAL ACTIONS-Loss STATE REMEDY THEORY
With respect to the application of federal law in the short-form
merger setting, lack of adequate disclosure may give rise to a Section 10(b)
right of action. 5 In this context, the potential loss of an available state
remedy, such as appraisal, may trigger the invocation of Section 10(b).36
Even though minority shareholders in a short-form merger lack the requisite
voting power to prevent the merger's consummation, loss causation may be
established by proving that inadequate disclosure lulled such shareholders
to bypass an available state remedy that would have protected them from
methods which are generally considered acceptable in the financial community
and otherwise admissible in court. .. .," (ii) fair value must be based on "all
relevant factors" which include not only "elements of future value... which are
known or susceptible of proof as of the date of the merger" but also, when the
court finds it appropriate, "damages, resulting from the taking, which the
stockholders sustain as a class;" and (iii) "a plaintiffs monetary remedy
ordinarily should be confined to the more liberalized appraisal proceedingherein
established...."
Glassman, 777 A.2d at 246 (quoting Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 713-14).
34Glassman, 777 A.2d at 248. Such a cash-out transaction by a controlling shareholder
having material inside information violates Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act. See
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (recognizing that silence is violative of section
10(b) where there is a fiduciary duty to disclose); William Wang & Marc Steinberg, Insider
Trading (1996 & 2002 Supp.).
35Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000). See generally ALAN R.
BROMBERO & LEwIS D. LOWENFELS, SE URITIEs FRAUD & COMMODmES FRAUD (CCH Bus.
Law. eds., 2d ed. 1993) (detailing federal securities laws). If a controlling shareholder owning
less than ninety percent of the subject corporation's shares makes a tender offer to attain that
equity status, such transaction will invoke the SEC's going private and/or tender offer rules. See
supra note 18.
36Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1107 (1991) (leaving open
whether a federal court of action lies where shareholders are deprived of state law remedies); Field
v. Trump, 850 F.2d 938, 948 (2d Cir. 1998) (recognizing the validation of section 10(b) actions
irrespective of the existence of remedies under state law); Healey v. Catalyst Recovery, Inc., 616
F.2d 641, 646 (3d Cir. 1980) (pointing out that loss of state remedies can form the basis for a
10(b) claim); Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 221 (2d Cir. 1977) (allowing a 10(b) suit where
inadequate disclosure prevents shareholders from protecting themselves).
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financial loss, namely that of appraisal." The loss state remedy theory has
been embraced by lower federal courts" and likely will remain viable in the
short-form merger setting."
VI. CONCLUSION
The Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Glassman signifies a
return to the principles enunciated four decades ago in Stauffer v. Standard
Brands Inc.4° that, absent fraud or illegality, appraisal is a minority
shareholder's exclusive remedy in a short-form merger.4 The decision thus
facilitates the consummation of mergers that purportedly should prove
beneficial to the economy.' 2 Minority shareholder protection is provided
by the application of "all relevant factors!' in the appraisal proceeding to
"See United States v. Margala, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
198,363 (9th Cir. 1981) (allowing a 10(b) suit where inadequate disclosure prevents shareholders
from protecting themselves from loss); MARC STEINBERG, UNDERSTANDING SECURITIES LAW
§ 8.05 (3d ed. 2001).
3 See Wilson v. Great Am. Indus., Inc., 979 F.2d 924, 931 (2d Cir. 1992); Howing Co.
v. Nationwide Corp., 927 F.2d 700, 708-09 (6th Cir. 1992). But see Isquith v. Caremark Int'l,
Inc., 136 F.3d 531, 535 (7th Cir. 1998) (refusing to allow federal securities action absent a
showing of deceased market value of the shareholders stock). See generally Marc Steinberg &
William A. Reece, The Supreme Court, ImpliedRights ofAction, andProxy Regulation, 54 OHIO
ST. L.J. 67, 102-13 (1993) (explaining the development of the loss state remedy theory).
39With respect to the duty of candor under Delaware law and its relationship to the
disclosure mandates of the federal securities laws, the Delaware Supreme Court addressed this
issue in Malone v. Brincat:
The historic roles played by state and federal law in regulating corporate
disclosures have been not only compatible but complimentary. That symbiotic
relationship has been perpetuated by the recently enacted federal Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998. Although that statute by its terms
does not apply to this case, the new statute will require securities class actions
involving the purchase or sale of nationally traded securities, based upon false
or misleading statements, to be brought exclusively in federal court under federal
law. The 1998 Act, however, contains two important exceptions: the first
provides that an "exclusively derivative action brought by one or more
shareholders on behalf ofa corporation" is not preempted; the second preserves
the availability of state court class actions, where state law already provides that
corporate directors have fiduciary disclosure obligations to shareholders. These
exceptions have become known as the "Delaware carve-outs."
Malone, 722 A.2d at 13 (footnotes omitted).
-187 A.2d 78 (Del. 1962).
41Id. at 80. See Glassman, 777 A.2d at 24748.
2See KENNETHM. DAvIDsON, MEGA-MERGERS (1985); KNIGHTS, RAIDERS&TARGETs
(Jack Coffee et al. eds., 1988); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fishel, The Proper Role of
Target Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARv. L. REV. 1161 (1981); Editorial,
A Happy Jig, WALL ST. J., Oct. 7, 1985.
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ensure that "fair value" is awarded.43 In order to make this process
function properly-facilitating short-form mergers while according
minority shareholders fair consideration-adequate disclosure becomes a
paramount determinant." Without disclosure of all material facts, minority
shareholders may be lulled into inaction, bypassing their appraisal rights."
Accordingly, failure to provide adequate disclosure should entitle any
shareholder to invoke an appropriate remedy within a reasonable time after
becoming aware of such disclosure deficiency.' This construction, while
recognizing controlling ownership interests, preserves in some measure the
legitimate economic interests of minority shareholders.
43Glassman, 777 A.2d at 247-48.
"Id. at 248.
4sUnited States v. Margala, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
98,363 (9th Cir. 1981).
4 See supra notes 16, 20, 24-28 and accompanying text. If such disclosure deficiency is
knowingly disseminated to the minority by the majority shareholder, an action for fraud and
breach of fiduciary duty may be stated, giving rise to the award of appropriate relief, including
rescissory damages. See supra notes 29-40 and accompanying text.
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